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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, government has been given more leeway when invoking its
interests in safeguarding the public health than when asserting other state
interests. Thus, for example, when considering a constitutional challenge to
mandatory smallpox immunization in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court employed its highly deferential, rational basis review rather
than the stricter level of scrutiny that it normally employs when individuals
assert interests in bodily integrity.' Similarly, Congress and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) have imposed greater restrictions on the speech
of pharmaceutical companies than have been considered acceptable for
speech in other commercial settings.
In recent years, however, it appears that a trend is developing toward
applying the same level of constitutional scrutiny to health regulation. In
AbigailAlliance, a three-judge panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit overrode FDA regulations to recognize a constitutional right of access
for patients to experimental chemotherapy.' In Western States, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down advertising restrictions imposed on pharmacies
by Congress.'
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Samuel R. Rosen Professor
and Co-Director, Hall Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis.
'Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-29 (1905).
2 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Abigail II), 445
F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). To be sure, the
en banc D.C. Circuit reversed the panel's decision fifteen months later.
'Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr. (Western States), 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
300 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011
To some extent, it makes sense to treat health regulation more like other
kinds of regulation. Government may be too quick to sacrifice individual
liberty when threats to health loom. However, courts may be
overcompensating in their efforts to right the balance between individual
liberties and the public's interest in good health.
In this article, I consider the balance between liberty and health in the
context of the right to speak. More specifically, I examine the commercial
speech doctrine and suggest how courts should draw the balance between
state interests in public health and corporate interests in promotional speech.
I argue that there are two important doctrines for retaining some special
treatment of public health concerns. First, rather than following the Jacobson
principle of deference to legislative judgment, courts should follow the
principle of deference to the judgment of public health officials that was
enunciated in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.' Second, courts
should invoke the principle of trust and its concomitant duty of loyalty to
adequately recognize the interests of individuals in not having their
relationships with physicians, pharmacists, and other health care providers
exploited for the providers' personal gain.
II. THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF HEALTH CARE
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court treated health care
matters differently than issues arising in other industries or settings. When
private or public actors invoked health concerns to justify their conduct, the
Court often expressed less skepticism than when other reasons were invoked
for public or private conduct.' Thus, for example, for many years the Court did
not apply antitrust law against health care providers as aggressively as it did
against individuals or companies in other businesses, until it changed course
in the 1970s. 6
While the special status of health care has influenced doctrine in a
number of legal fields, including tort and contracts law, this article focuses on
its special status in constitutional law. More specifically, this article focuses on
the special status of public health justifications in constitutional law. After
describing the Supreme Court's historic principle of deference when
governments invoked health concerns, the article describes a current trend
toward treating health concerns like other state interests.
A. PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in matters of public health dates back
to its 1905 opinion in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.7 In that
case, Henning Jacobson objected to a local regulation that required him to
* Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
'See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 1296 (7th ed. 2007).
6 See id. at 1171, 1296.
7 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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receive a smallpox vaccination.' The regulation was authorized under a state
statute, and the Court considered the constitutionality of the statute.9
What is striking about the Court's opinion is its broad deference to the
judgment of the state legislature. According to the Court, the Constitution was
not offended by the statute because it did not represent an "unusual, . . .
unreasonable or arbitrary requirement.""o It did not go "far beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public," nor did it lack a "real"
relationship with the public health interests at stake. 2
Of course, the Court rarely strikes down a statute when it requires only
that the law not be unreasonable or arbitrary. This is the language of rational
basis review, language that the Court invokes when it is not receptive to an
individual's interest in escaping the reach of a law. Indeed, while the Court
referred to Mr. Jacobson's interests in exercising free will, caring for his body,
and controlling his body," the Court did not suggest that the interests had
special importance." This oversight cannot be explained by the fact that the
case was decided well before the Supreme Court began to develop its
fundamental rights doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s. Just fourteen years
before Jacobson, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, the Court wrote
that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person.""
Jacobson's principle of deference to government officials on matters of
public health lived on for decades. Thus, in the 1992 Adams case, when
prostitutes challenged a state statute that required them to be tested for HIV-
infection, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Jacobson for the proposition that
"the States have been allowed broad discretion in the formulation of measures
designed to protect and promote public health."6 The Illinois court saw no
fundamental rights being implicated by the forced testing and required only
that the statute bear "a rational relationship" to the state's public health
goals. 7 Because the court employed rational basis review, it could uphold the
statute even though medical experts testified that the testing policy was
ineffective and possibly counterproductive to the protection of the public's
health.'" In short, the Justices in Jacobson and Adams allowed legislative
officials broad discretion in shaping public health policy.
Or consider the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe. 9 In that
case, the Court reviewed a challenge to a New York law that provided for a
' Id. at 22.
9 Id. at 24.
10 Id. at 27.
n Id. at 28.
12 Id. at 31.
1 Id. at 26, 29.
14 See id. at 26 ("There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good .... This court has more than once recognized . . . that 'persons' . . . are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state .. . .").
s Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
1 People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ill. 1992).7 Id. at 586.
1s Id. at 577.
19 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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computerized database to track drug prescriptions for controlled substances.20
In deciding whether the state's interest in limiting problems with drug abuse
could justify the invasion of patient privacy, the Court observed that "States
have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions" and that the
statute was the "product of an orderly and rational legislative decision."21
III. THE EROSION OF HEALTH CARE'S PRIVILEGED STATUS
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have demonstrated a greater willingness to challenge the public health
justifications that governments advance to justify their limitations on
individual liberties.
A. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE
Abigail Alliance involved a claim that terminally ill adult patients should
be able to purchase experimental drugs that had not yet been approved for
sale by the FDA, once the patients had exhausted all other FDA-approved
treatment options.22
Under long-standing FDA policy, pharmaceutical companies need to test
new drugs in successive research trials and submit the data from the studies to
the FDA for approval of the drugs.2 1 In the absence of FDA-approval, the
companies are prohibited from marketing a new drug. They can make it
available only for limited purposes -to patients who participate in one of the
research trials or to a small number of patients whose use of the drug is
21
approved by the FDA under its "compassionate use" program.
Because the process for conducting the research trials and receiving FDA
approval can take many years, terminally ill patients may die while waiting for
a drug that might prolong their lives. 25 The plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance
therefore asked the court to require a revision of FDA restrictions on access to
experimental drugs for terminally ill patients.26 More specifically, the
plaintiffs asked the court to allow the sale of experimental drugs once they
passed through the first stage of testing for safety but before they passed
through the later stages of testing for both safety and effectiveness.27
The FDA opposed the plaintiffs' request on the grounds that making
cancer chemotherapy available before completion of the drug testing process
would fail to recognize the "importance of marketing drugs with reasonable
20 Id. at 591.
21 Id. at 597.22 Abigail II, 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
23 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.21(a)-(c) (2010); see also Abigail II, 445 F.3d at 473 ("The FDA has
promulgated regulations that require three phases of government testing on humans before
investigational new drugs can receive FDA approval.").
24 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2010); see also Abigail II, 445 F.3d at 474 (internal citation
omitted) ("Although the FDA may permit 'treatment use' of unapproved new drugs, the FDA
has refused as a general matter to allow terminally ill patients to have access to investigational
new drugs that have successfully completed Phase I trials.").
2 SeeAbigail II, 445 F.3d at 473-74.
26 Id. at 471.
27 Id.
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knowledge for patients and physicians of their likely clinical benefit and their
toxicity."" Most cancer drugs "have potentially lethal toxicity" as well as the
likelihood of substantial compromise of "a patient's remaining quality of
life."2 9 Accordingly, it would not serve patients' interests "to make drugs too
widely available before there is a reasonable assessment of such risks."3 o
In a surprising decision, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit recognized a constitutional right for terminally ill patients.
Specifically, the court held that "where there are no alternative government-
approved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult
patient" has a fundamental interest in "access to potentially life-saving"
experimental drugs that have successfully completed the first phase of
testing." The court then sent the case back to the trial court to determine
whether the FDA could justify its policy under the most demanding
constitutional standard of demonstrating that the policy was "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."32
After review by the full court (i.e., en banc review), the D.C. Circuit
reversed the decision fifteen months later,3 but the willingness of the initial
panel to subject the FDA's judgment to a strict standard of review represented
a sharp departure from the traditional deference of courts to government
regulation on behalf of the public's health.
B. WESTERN STATES
While Abigail Alliance saw a federal appellate court invoke substantive
due process to cabin FDA regulation, Western States saw the U.S. Supreme
Court invoke the First Amendment to limit the regulatory power of Congress
and the FDA.
In Western States, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
federal statute that regulated the practice of prescription drug "compounding"
by pharmacists. For most patients, pharmacists dispense pills that have been
manufactured by a pharmaceutical company.s But for some patients, the
pharmacist actually creates a medication that is tailored to the needs of that
patient." As the Court wrote, "compounding is typically used to prepare
medications that are not commercially available, such as medication for a
patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-produced product.""
Compounding also can be used to provide drugs in forms that are more
palatable for children (e.g., as a pleasantly-flavored syrup rather than a
medicinal-tasting tablet).
" Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Abigail III), 495
F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).29 Id.
30d.
3 1 AbigailII, 445 F.3d at 486.
32 Id.
33 Abigail III, 495 F.3d at 728.
3 Western States, 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
s See id. at 360-63.
36 Id. at 360.
37 Id. at 361.
3 Id. at 377.
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Ordinarily, as indicated in the AbigailAlliance discussion, new drugs may
not be marketed without FDA approval.39 However, the FDA had left
regulation of drug compounding to the states.40
Because of concerns that some pharmacists were using their
compounding authority to manufacture and sell new drugs without satisfying
FDA requirements, the FDA imposed new regulations in 1992, and Congress
passed a regulatory statute in 1997.41 Among the statutory rules were
provisions that raised First Amendment concerns. Congress had required that
prescriptions for compounded drugs not be solicited by pharmacists and that
pharmacies could only advertise the fact that they provided compounding
services without being able to advertise the fact that they could compound a
"particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug."42
The Court struck down the restrictions on solicitation and advertising on
the ground that Congress could achieve its public health goals without
limiting speech. If Congress was concerned that some pharmacists were
using their compounding authority to become manufacturers of new drugs,
Congress could address the problem directly by limiting the amount of
compounding that pharmacists could do or by restricting the circumstances
under which pharmacists could provide compounding services.' In striking
down the solicitation and advertising provisions, the Court applied its
standard First Amendment analysis for regulations of "commercial speech,""
without giving any special consideration to the fact that health-based
regulations were at issue.
Thus, while the Supreme Court in Jacobson began the twentieth century
by establishing special deference to governmental regulations designed to
protect the public's health, it began the twenty-first century by suggesting in
Western States that health regulations would be analyzed in the same way as
other governmental regulations designed to promote the public's general
welfare.
Although the Court was too willing to recognize claims based on the
public health in the past, it may be too skeptical of public health claims
currently. By considering public health regulation in the context of the First
Amendment, we can identify important principles for drawing an appropriate
balance between liberty and health.
3 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40 Western States, 535 U.S. at 362.
41 Id. at 362-64.
42 Id. at 364-65.
43 Id. at 372.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 367-68.
46 Indeed, the Court established its commercial speech doctrine in a case involving state
regulation of the sale of prescription drugs by pharmacies. In that case, the Court struck down
a Virginia ban on advertising by pharmacies of drug prices. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
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IV. CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO HEALTH
REGULATION
Two kinds of health care regulations have prompted First Amendment
challenges in recent years. As in Western States, litigants have challenged
direct restrictions on speech promoting the sale of prescription drugs. In
addition, plaintiffs have sued over a kind of indirect regulation of
pharmaceutical promotion-the use of prescription drug data that can be
assembled from pharmacy records to better target a company's marketing
efforts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in January 2011 in a case
involving regulation of prescription drug information. 7
A. DIRECT RESTRICTION OF PROMOTIONAL SPEECH
The challenges to the direct restriction of promotional speech target an
FDA policy that prohibits employees or other agents of pharmaceutical
companies from promoting the "off-label" use of prescription drugs." When a
drug manufacturer seeks approval for a new drug, the manufacturer does so
for a specific use or uses.4 9 Thus, for example, a company may request
approval of a new drug for the treatment of diabetes. In support of its request,
the company would present data from its research trials demonstrating the
safety and effectiveness of the drug in treating diabetes."o If the FDA approves
the drug, it will approve the drug for the treatment of diabetes." Accordingly,
the drug company may include information only about that use when it prints
its labeling information for the drug (as, for example, in the package insert
that pharmacists provide when filling a prescription for the drug), and the
drug company may market the drug only for the approved purpose." When it
advertises the drug, when its sales representatives speak to physicians or
pharmacists, or when the company contracts with non-employee physicians to
present talks about the new drug, the company's spokespersons may only
discuss the use of the drug for diabetes."
Of course, many drugs are useful for treating more than one disease, and
physicians may discover that when using a drug for an approved purpose, it
provides other benefits to patients. The FDA permits physicians to prescribe
drugs for purposes other than an approved purpose, and it permits physicians
and others who are not agents of the manufacturer of the drug to discuss
unapproved uses." However, if a company wants to promote the drug for
additional uses, it must present data to the FDA demonstrating the safety and
effectiveness of the drug for the additional uses." In short, the FDA does not
7 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 857
(2011) (No. 10-779).
4 Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-
Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review under Greater New Orleans, 62
FoOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 6 (2007).
49 Id. at 4-5.
1 Id. at 4.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 6.
53 Id.
5 Id. at 6-8.
- Id. at 5-6.
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restrict all speech promoting unapproved uses of a drug; it only restricts
promotional speech by the drug company.
Why does the FDA distinguish between promotional speech by the
company and promotional speech by other persons about an unapproved use?
The FDA wants to ensure that drug companies have a sufficient incentive to
undertake rigorous research trials to test the drug for the unapproved uses.5
There are many examples of physicians using drugs that they thought were
safe and effective for new uses, but that turned out not to be so. 57 Without
careful testing of a drug, many patients may be harmcd." Even judii al ritic
of the FDA restrictions recognize the legitimacy of the FDA's interest in
encouraging pharmaceutical companies to seek approval for new uses of their
drugs.5 9
In response to the litigation over the marketing of off-label uses, the FDA
has modified its policies for off-label drug promotion, allowing some forms of
promotional activity that it once prohibited and that drew the most
criticism.o In particular, drug companies are no longer prohibited from
disseminating articles from medical journals that discuss off-label uses of
their drugs, nor are they prohibited from suggesting to an independent
sponsor of continuing medical education programs that off-label uses of their
drugs be discussed in one of the sponsor's educational programs.
Nevertheless, the FDA retains its general authority to restrict the promotion
of unapproved uses of drugs by pharmaceutical companies.62
How should courts assess the constitutional questions when Congress or
the FDA regulates the promotional speech of drug companies? In some cases,
we might question whether First Amendment concerns are implicated at all.
In the case of pharmaceutical companies promoting off-label uses of their
drugs, the ban on promotional speech constitutes the functional equivalent of
a ban on the widespread sale of the drugs for off-label uses (i.e., a ban on
conduct). Some off-label use of a drug makes sense as a way to identify
potentially valuable new uses of a drug, but widespread use would be
premature in the absence of studies to judge the safety and effectiveness of the
new use. If the FDA prohibited the substantial selling of drugs for off-label
uses, there would not be a First Amendment problem." However, it would be
difficult to implement such a prohibition. Pharmaceutical companies sell to
wholesalers and pharmacies, but physicians decide when and for which
'6 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
that after a drug approved for a particular use is in interstate commerce, "one of the few
mechanisms available to FDA to compel manufacturer behavior is to constrain their marketing
options"), vacated as moot sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
57 Id. at 56-57.
58 Id.
-' See, e.g., id. at 72.
60 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("In
response to questioning at oral argument, the government definitively stated that it subscribed
to the 'safe harbor' interpretation and further explained that, in its view, neither the FDAMA
nor the CME Guidance independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or to sanction speech.").
6] Id. at 335-36.
62 Id. at 336.
63 This would be akin to a limitation on the amount of compounding that pharmacists
could undertake. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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reasons to prescribe a drug. How would FDA officials know whether a
pharmaceutical company was selling a drug for on-label or off-label uses? The
FDA can pursue its goal of preventing substantial sales of a drug for off-label
uses only by banning the promotion of a drug for off-label uses-it will be
more difficult for a company to generate substantial sales for off-label uses if
it does not promote the off-label uses.
If we reject this functional argument, then the direct regulation of
promotional speech by drug companies fits comfortably within the Supreme
Court's framework for analyzing other cases involving commercial speech. The
commercial speech cases typically revolve around restrictions on advertising
or other methods by which individuals or companies propose transactions
with potential customers. Thus, the Court has considered restrictions on the
advertising of tobacco products,"4 alcoholic beverages,6" and legal services"
under its commercial speech doctrine. Likewise, the Court used the
commercial speech doctrine to address restrictions on advertising by
pharmacists in Western States,'7 and lower courts have employed the doctrine
to address restrictions on advertising by pharmaceutical companies in the off-
label cases."
Does it make sense for courts to apply the usual Central Hudson
framework for advertising when it considers advertising by drug companies or
other providers of health care services rather than by providers of non-health
care services? The framework itself makes sense. Under Central Hudson,
courts consider four factors. If the "commercial speech concerns unlawful
activity or is misleading," it does not receive protection under the First
Amendment.6 9 If the speech is about lawful activity and is not misleading,
then the regulation must satisfy three requirements: the regulation must
promote a substantial governmental interest, it must directly advance the
governmental interest, and it must not be more extensive than is necessary to
serve the interest. 70
These factors are generally appropriate when applied to regulations of
health care-related promotional speech. Protecting the public health is a
substantial governmental interest, and it is reasonable to require government
to implement regulations in a way that serves its public health interests
without unnecessarily restricting speech.
That said, one important modification of the Central Hudson standard
would ensure a proper balance between the government's need to protect
patients from the harms that drugs or other health care services can cause and
the First Amendment interests of those who wish to advertise their health care
services. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,7' the Supreme Court
6See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
65 See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
16 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
67 Western States, 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
6 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Wash.
Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Hall & Sobotka,
supra note 48, at 13.
61 Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
70 Id.
n Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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faced a similar question regarding the balance between individual rights and
governmental concerns about public health. Arline involved a school system's
decision to fire an elementary school teacher when she suffered a third relapse
of tuberculosis.72 The teacher claimed that her firing constituted unlawful
discrimination on the basis of disability, and the Court had to draw a balance
between the individual right to be free of discrimination and the
governmental interest in protecting the public's health.73 The Court held that
the government is entitled to limit the activities of persons with
communicable diseases when those persons pose a significant health risk to
others.74 The Court further instructed lower courts that when deciding
whether a person poses a significant risk to the health of others and therefore
could be subject to restrictions of individual liberty, the courts should defer to
the medical judgment of public health officials. 7 Determining when measures
are appropriate for protecting the health of the public is a difficult question,
and courts are more likely to draw the right balance when they defer to
medical experts than when they defer to legislators or try to make their own
judgments.76
A principle of deference to public health officials would have generated
reasonable outcomes in past cases. Take Jacobson, for example. While the
Supreme Court employed a standard of deference to legislative judgment in
rejecting Henning Jacobson's challenge to mandatory smallpox
immunizationn the holding would have been the same under a standard of
deference to public health officials. When the Massachusetts legislature
authorized mandatory vaccination, it did so "only when, in the opinion of the
board of health, [immunization] was necessary for the public health or the
public safety."7 In other words, the statute itself incorporated a principle of
deference to the judgment of public health officials.79 Or consider Western
States. In that case, the Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson standard
and rejected, by a 5-4 vote, a total ban on the advertising of compounding for
particular drugs, classes of drug, or types of drug.so As mentioned, the ban had
been passed by Congress in a 1997 statute."1 However, in its 1992 regulatory
guidance, the FDA did not adopt a total ban on such advertising." Rather, it
identified advertising of compounding for particular drugs, classes of drugs or
7 Id. at 276.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 287 n.16. Since the case was decided under the Rehabilitation Act, its holding
applies to private recipients of federal funding. And since the case's reasoning was
incorporated into the Americans with Disabilities Act, it applies as well to all private operators
of public accommodations. Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA's Direct
Threat Defense, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1279, 1297-1305 (2001).
75Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
76 Cf Leslie E. Gerwin, Planning for Pandemic: A New Model for Governing Public Health
Emergencies, 37 Am. J.L. & MED. 128, 132-33 (2011) (proposing an independent expert body to
advise governors or other executive officials who are considering whether to invoke their
emergency powers in response to threats to the public health).
7 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-28 (1905).
78 Id. at 27 (quoting MAsS. REV. LAws ch. 75, § 137 (1902)).
7 See id.
80 See Western States, 535 U.S. 357, 374, 377 (2002).
81 Id. at 360; see also Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 127(a),
21 U.S.C. § 353a (2006).
82 See Western States at 362-63.
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types of drugs as one of several factors that could trigger an FDA
investigation." Making the advertising a factor to be taken into account in
deciding whether a violation of promotional regulations occurred, rather than
making the advertising an automatic violation, is more sensitive to First
Amendment concerns, and it was the policy adopted by the public health
officials rather than the legislators.
In applying a principle of judicial deference to the judgment of officials
with special expertise, the Supreme Court has not limited that principle to
health care matters, nor has it limited the principle to non-constitutional
matters. When the Court issued its most recent decisions on affirmative action
in higher education, it held that courts should defer to the judgment of
university officers in deciding whether affirmative action policies meet the
constitutional standard of being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest."
In short, judicial deference can serve an important role in cases involving
constitutional rights. When the judgment of people with special expertise is
involved, the Court has recognized the value of relying on their judgment.
B. INDIRECT REGULATION OF PROMOTIONAL SPEECH
In the indirect regulation line of cases, it also makes sense for courts to
give special consideration to the medical nature of the regulations.
These cases involve regulations of "data mining" by health information
companies. The companies compile information from pharmacies about their
drug prescriptions, analyze the data, and sell their analyses to pharmaceutical
companies so the companies' sales representatives can better target their
marketing activities." For example, the sales representative would know
whether a doctor prefers the company's drug for high blood pressure, or
whether the doctor prefers a competitor's drug." The representative also
would know if the doctor recently switched from using one drug to using
another drug for one patient or many patients. 7 While data mining
companies provide analyses that allow a drug company to discover the
prescribing practices of a particular physician, the names of patients have
been stripped from the data to preserve their anonymity."
Critics of data mining have observed that it can aggravate problems
associated with the promotional activities of drug companies.8 9
Pharmaceutical company marketing can result in the prescribing of a drug
that provides less benefit, causes more side effects, or comes with a higher
price tag than an alternative drug.90 In addition, the marketing can result in
the prescribing of a drug when no drug was actually needed. Thus,
" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 71a, Western States, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (No. 01-344)
(Appendix D of the Petition).
* Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
's David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients' Interests,
38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 74 (2010).
86 See id. at 74-75.
7 See id. at 75.
88 Id.
88 Id.
90 See id. at 75-76.
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prescription drug data can contribute to both physical harm and financial
harm for patients.9'
In response to concerns about data mining, three states have passed laws
regulating the use of prescription data by drug companies to promote their
products. In New Hampshire, drug companies may use data that has been
aggregated, but they cannot examine the prescribing practices of a particular
physician. 92 In Vermont, drug companies can use physician-specific
prescribing information only if the physician gives consent (an "opt-in"
approach), 93 while in Maine, drug companies can use physician-specific
prescribing information unless a physician objects by registering with the
state (an "opt-out" approach).94
Thus far, all three statutes have been challenged in court, and the legal
cases have generated a split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The First Circuit
upheld both New Hampshire's ban" and Maine's opt-out approach," while
the Second Circuit invalidated the Vermont opt-in strategy.97 The Supreme
Court accepted certiorari in the Vermont case on January 7, 2011.98
As many writers have observed, it is not clear that these regulations
should trigger First Amendment protection at all. While the contours of the
First Amendment are not clear, its protection has extended not to the mere
use of words or information but to some form of expression, whether it be the
advocacy of political or religious views, the reporting of news, the writing of a
novel, the painting of a picture or the advertising of a commercial product.99
The data mining laws regulate economic transactions between data mining
companies and their customers, not the content of their expression.'o Thus,
for example, drug company sales representatives are free to deliver the same
messages to physicians and pharmacists in Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont that they deliver in other states.o'0 Following this line of thinking, the
First Circuit concluded that the sale of prescription data constitutes
commercial conduct rather than commercial speech and therefore it does not
raise First Amendment concerns.10 2
' See id. at 75.
92 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2010).
93 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4631(d) (2010).
9 Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 78; see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1711-E(2) to (2-A)
(2010).
9' See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 64 (1st Cir. 2008).
96 See IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 32 (1st Cir. 2010).
9 See IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 282 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 857 (2011) (No. 10-779).
9 Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857
(2011).
9 And of course, not all expression is protected. States may prohibit the publication of
obscenity or speech that is likely to incite imminent violence. See generally Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
'00 See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 80.
'o1 See id.
102 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Other scholars have pointed to the many constitutionally uncontroversial
statutes that protect the privacy of personal information.0 3 Federal laws
restrict the use of customer data by credit card companies, video rental stores,
and health care providers.' To be sure, the data mining companies try to
protect patient privacy by stripping patient names from their data, but
confidentiality may not be adequately protected that way.o' Moreover, there is
more to the privacy concern than anonymity, as exemplified by principles of
professional responsibility in medicine and principles of agency in law.
The relationship between patients and their physicians, pharmacists, and
other health care providers depend very much on considerations of trust."a'
For patients, their health-and indeed their lives-may be at stake, their
sickness may leave them vulnerable and unable to help themselves, and they
lack the expertise to make their own assessments about their medical needs.0 7
Consequently, principles of medical ethics impose a number of duties on
physicians to promote and preserve patient trust.08 Doctors must maintain
patient confidentiality, they must obtain the patient's informed consent to
treatment, and they must minimize conflicts of interest.0 9
The duty to minimize conflicts of interest reflects a key element of the
duty to maintain trust-physicians, pharmacists, and other health care
providers may use the information they gain from their relationships with
patients to serve the patient's interests, but they may not exploit the
relationship for personal gain."0 If patients must wonder whether medical
personnel are pursuing their own interests, then patient trust will diminish,
and the ability of physicians and other providers to treat illness will be
impaired. Thus, while health care providers may charge for their services-for
they otherwise would not be able to afford to provide the services-they
should not try to extract additional financial rewards from their relationships
with patients. For example, physicians should not refer patients to
laboratories or radiologic facilities in which the physicians invest."'
In the context of data mining, when pharmacies sell information about
prescriptions for their own profit and that of pharmaceutical companies,
patients can easily worry about the trustworthiness of their pharmacists. If
pharmacies cut ethical corners with their use of patient information for
personal gain, will their desire for personal gain also lead them to cut corners
with their measures to protect patient confidentiality or with their standards
for ensuring the safety of the drugs they dispense? If patients are uncertain
about the trustworthiness of pharmacists, then patients may be less willing to
fill their prescriptions after receiving them from their doctors.
10' Brief for New England Journal of Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae at 10-20, Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., petition for cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 771329
at *10-20.
104 Id. at *14, *18-20, *32-33.
105 See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 75-76.
100 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 470-71 (2002).
107 David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 147-48 (1995).
1os Id.
1o9 Id.
110 Id.
111 And in fact, federal law prohibits most such "self-referrals" by physicians. HALL,
BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 1372-73.
312 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011
Even strong advocates of First Amendment protection for companies that
collect and use personal data for commercial purposes recognize a distinction
between health care information and other kinds of information. In his
argument on behalf of the free flow of information, Eugene Volokh does not
object to laws that protect the privacy of health care information on the
ground that such laws simply reinforce the implicit promise of health care
providers to maintain the privacy of that information.112
Principles of agency law also support the ability of legislatures to enact
statutes restricting the use of prescription data for commercial purposes. The
agent's duty of loyalty precludes agents from exploiting their relationship with
principals for personal enrichment."' Accordingly, when agents use
confidential information that they acquire in the course of their relationship
with the principal, the principal has the right to capture any profits made
from the use of the information."' Similarly, in addition to prohibiting lawyers
from disclosing confidential information they gain while representing their
clients, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits lawyers from
using the information to the disadvantage of the client."' Prescription data
laws simply reinforce the duty of loyalty that pharmacists owe their patients.
As the agent's duty of loyalty suggests, it would not be a problem for
pharmacies to make prescription data available to public health officials or
researchers who use the data to better understand how to improve health and
health care. And in fact, the state statutes distinguish between using
prescription data for drug company promotion and using it for health care
research."'
But why should we distinguish between a pharmacist charging a patient
to fill a prescription and a pharmacist selling prescription drug information to
a data mining company? Why does the duty of loyalty treat the pharmacist's
profit from selling prescription data differently than the pharmacist's profit
from filling a prescription? In both cases, not only does the pharmacist
personally profit, but the patient also benefits. When a pharmacy sells
prescription drug information, its operating costs are lower, and it can afford
to lower the prices it charges to patients.
There are two responses to this argument. First, while pharmacists profit
when they fill prescriptions, they do not write the prescriptions. Thus, even
though pharmacists have an economic incentive to encourage patients to fill
prescriptions, they cannot exploit that incentive by issuing unnecessary
prescriptions-they have to wait for patients to come to the pharmacy with a
prescription written by a physician. Second, patients recognize that
112 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057-
58 (2000).
n1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (2010). See also Thomas L.
Hafemeister and Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians' Fiduciary Duty to
Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 KAN. L. REV. 491, 519-32 (2009) (discussing the
physician's fiduciary duty to patients in the context of drug company marketing efforts).
n1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (2010); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 12.7, at 12-22 (Supp. 2004).
115 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2011).
n1 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2010).
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pharmacies profit by filling prescriptions.17 When patients bring their
prescriptions to a pharmacy, they are tacitly consenting to the pharmacist's
profit."s However, patients are not aware that their prescription data is sold
to data mining companies, so the pharmacist's profit is not sanctioned by
patient consent."19
In sum, the special nature of health care information suggests that the
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont laws should not trigger First
Amendment concerns, and the Supreme Court should uphold them. Or as
Neil Richards has argued, these kinds of regulations should be subject to the
highly deferential rational basis level of review that the Court employs when
constitutional rights are not threatened. 2 0
Even if the Supreme Court were to characterize trade in prescription data
as commercial speech, it still should uphold the data mining laws under the
same approach as suggested for laws that directly regulate the speech of drug
companies. As discussed above, courts should defer to the judgment of public
health officials in applying the Central Hudson standard to regulations of
health care-based commercial speech.
How would such deference play out in the context of data mining
regulations? Recall that under Central Hudson, courts will uphold regulations
of commercial speech (a) that promote a substantial governmental interest,
(b) that directly advance the governmental interest, and (c) that are not more
extensive than is necessary to serve the interest.'2 ' The states with data mining
statutes cite their interests in protecting public health and containing health
care costs,' 2' and these readily qualify as substantial state interests. Indeed,
even the courts that have found data mining statutes unconstitutional
recognized that the state's interests satisfied the substantial interest prong of
Central Hudson."' Judicial disagreement has centered on the next two prongs
of Central Hudson. Courts have questioned whether the states have
established a sufficient connection between data mining and harm to patient
health or between data mining and high health care costs." 4 Courts also have
questioned whether restrictions of speech are necessary to address the
problems that data mining raises."' Under this article's proposed approach,
courts should defer to the judgment of public health officials in deciding
117 See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MIcH. L. REV. 643, 682 (2008) (footnotes omitted)
("[D]rug companies are not fiduciaries but sell wares like any merchant. Second, drug prices
are readily stated and readily disclosed before purchase, so that, unlike hospital prices,
pharmaceutical prices reflect what many informed purchasers will pay in arm's length
transactions.").
"' See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 76-77.
"9 I am grateful to Professor Kevin Outterson for this point. See also HALL, BOBINSKI &
ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 1373.
12 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1173-74 (2005).
121 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
122 See, e.g., id. at 568; IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011) (No. 10-779).
123 See, e.g., Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 275-76; IMS Health v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 178,
183 (D.N.H. 2007), rev'd, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
124 See, e.g., Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 275-76; Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 180-82.
125 See, e.g., Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 279-82; Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d, at 181-83.
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whether data mining statutes meet the Central Hudson requirements that
regulations of speech directly advance the state's interests and that the
restrictions of speech are not more extensive than necessary.
It may seem to make more sense for courts to defer to public health
officials on the question whether data mining statutes directly advance the
state's interests than on whether the statutory restrictions on speech are not
more extensive than necessary. Public health officials are in a better position
than judges to decide whether a data mining statute will promote patient
health or contain health care costs. But are they in a bctter position than
judges to decide whether a data mining statute infringes too much on freedom
of speech? Yes. Another way to ask this question is to ask whether there are
other public health measures that infringe less on speech and that are
effective ways to protect patients from the harms of data mining. And public
health officials are better positioned than judges to assess the effectiveness of
alternative regulations. Consider again the analogy to judicial deference to
university officers on affirmative action. The Supreme Court adopted a policy
of deference even though one could argue that judges are better able than
education officers to decide whether an affirmative action policy violates
principles of equal protection.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past, courts showed too much deference to government officials
when deciding the constitutionality of health care regulations. Broad
deference to legislatures does not give adequate weight to the individual
interests at stake. On the other hand, there is important value in showing
deference to the judgment of public health officials, whose expertise makes
them much better able than legislators or judges to decide when health
regulations are needed.
In addition, when health regulations are designed to protect the integrity
of the relationship between patients and their health care providers by
enforcing the provider's duty of loyalty, courts should make space in the
Constitution for such regulations.
